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SUPPLEMENTAL ACTS
A CHAPTER IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION:
By EPNST Fi tEuD.1
The question whether the constitution of Illinois permits the
law upon a subject covered by a statute to be altered by an
act purporting on its face to be an independent enactment, while
in fact supplemental, instead of substituting, where it is possible,
amended provisions for the sections of the statute affected by the
change, is one of the many technical problems arising under the
requirements of a written constitutiori. At the present moment,
however, a special interest attaches to the question because it is
believed to affect the validity of the new woman's suffrage act.
Under these circumstances the latest decision involving the points2
invites comment. The decision sustains an act of 1911 for the
organization of school townships into high school districts, which
contains a provision that
"For the purpose of supporting a high school the township established
under the provisions of this act shall be regarded as a school district, andthe board of education thereof shall in all respects have the powers and dis-
charge the duties of boards of education elected under the general schoollaw."
It was contended that this provision, incorporating as it does
by reference a number of sections of the school law of 1909, is in
reality an amendment of the latter act and should have complied
with the constitutional requirements regarding amendatory acts.
This contention the court denies, holding that the act is complete
in itself and therefore, although it may incorporate provisions of
earlier statutes, is simply an application of the familiar legislative
L Professor of Law in the University of Chicago.2. People v. Crossley, 261 IlL 78; 103 N. E. 537, December 17, 1913.
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process of adopting certain portions of other statutes by reference,
and that the constitutional requirement has no application to a
statute of this kind. The court takes occasion to review its former
decisions upon this subject and the conclusion which is reached
calls for some criticism.
The constitution of Illinois, like that of a great many other
states, provides:
"That no law shall be revived or amended by reference to its title only,but the law revived or section amended shall be inserted at length in the
new act."3
This provision was intended to do away with a practice for-
merly common in the legislation of the states and which is not
unknown to the legislative systems of foreign countries; that is to
say, the practice of amending legislation by merely striking out or
inserting words, or making additions or substitutions by reference
to the place. in the old law where the change should be introduced.'
An amendatory act of this type would naturally convey no meaning
whatever to one not having at hand the original act into which
the new words or sentences are to be fitted. Confined to its orig-
inal purpose, the constitutional provision is easily understood and
complied with, and has never given rise to any serious difficulties.
In the case of Badenoch v. Chicago,5 the Illinois Supreme
Court, however, gave to this clause of the constitution an entirely
different application. An act of May 11, 1905, undertook to pro-
vide for the garnishment or attachment of the salary and wages
of certain municipal officers and employees. The court said:
"If the effect of the new act is to amend the general statutes of the state
upon the subjects of attachment and garnishment by intermingling the pro-
visions of the new act with the provisions of those statutes or by adding to
those statutes new provisions, so as to create out of the general statutesheretofore in force upon the subject of attachment and garnishment andthe new act a new law for the attachment and garnishment of the salaries
and wages of the officers and employees of certain municipal corpdrations
named in the title of the act, then the new act is clearly amendatory of the
old statutes upon those subjects and in violation of said constitutional pro-
visions."
And further:
"In the act under consideration the attachment and garnishment of
salaries and wages of officers and employees of certain municipal corpora-tions are the subjects dealt with, and, while the title of the act purports tobe the title of a complete act, it appears from the body of the act that it is
not a complete act in itself, but that the act is by itself, and when considered
alone, wholly ineffective and inoperative, and that its provisions cannot be
made effective and operative except by ingrafting the new act upon the
3. Art. 4, Sec. 13.
4. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 230.
5. 222 Ill. 71.
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attachment and garnishment acts heretofore in force in this state. In the
new act no provision is made for reducing the garnishing creditor's claim
to judgment, or for exhausting his remedy against his debtor's tangible
property by issuing an execution and having it returned no property found
nefore a garnishment proceeding is commenced, nor is there any method
pointed out in the new act for setting the garnishment proceeding in operation
by the filing of an affidavit that the garnishing creditor has reduced his claim
t judgment, that the personal property of his debtor has been exhausted,
and that the municipality or officer sought to be garnished is indebted to the
officer or employee against whom he has judgment. All the provisions regu-
lating these matters must be found in the general statutes upon the subject
of garnishment, and in the new act the grounds for attachment are not
stated, and the affidavit and bond, which are prerequisites to the issuing of
a writ of attachment, are not found, but these matters must also be sought
in the general statutes of the state regulating the issuing of writs of attach-
mnent. It thus appears that the act of 1905 is not a complete act within itself,
and that it amounts to nothing more than an attempt to change the existing
statutes of the state upon the subject of attachment and garnishment, so as
to make them broad enough to include within their terms the attachment and
garnishment of the salaries and wages of the officers and employees of the
municipal corporations named in the new act, by intermingling the provisions
of the new act with those of the statutes upon those subjects, the effect of
which clearly is to render it unconstitutional and void, as amounting to
amendments of the general statutes upon the subjects of attachment and
garnishment heretofore in force in this state."
Again, in the case of O'Connell v. McClenathan,6 the Supreme
Court had before it likewise an act relating to garnishment. This
act, approved June 11, 1897, provided in substance that it should
be lawful to summon administrators and executors as garnishees
and that they might be garnished with respect to moneys, goods,
or other estates belonging to any devisee or legatee under any will,
or to any heir or distributee, but that no final judgment should be
rendered against such administrators or executors until after an
order of distribution had been made; also that no assignment or
other disposition by an heir, legatee or devisee of his distributive
legacy or devise in the hands of any administrator or executor
should operate to defeat the garnishment of the same unless the
assignment, transfer or other disposition should be reduced to writ-
ing and filed in the proper county clerk's office before the service
or process of garnishment upon the executor or administrator.
This act was likewise held unconstitutional as being in effect an
amendment of the garnishment act.
These decisions cast considerable doubt upon the entire prac-
tice of supplemental legislation, which is universally and inevitably
resorted to for the purpose of introducing modifications into the
existing body of statutory law. The position taken by the Illinois
Supreme Court in the two cases cited found some support in a
6. 248 Ill. 350.
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number of early decisions in the State of Nebraska,7 and also in
an Oregon decision.8
Neither of the three jurisdictions, however, which have
declared supplemental acts to be unconstitutional as being in effect
simply amendments which ought to have been enacted by re-enact-
ing older statutes in amended form, had been able to carry out this
supposed requirement with any degree of consistency. In the pres-
ent case 9 the Supreme Court of Illinois reviews a number of
decisions in which what in one case 10 has not inaptly been called
"patchwork legislation" has been sustained. Even a cursory exam-
ination of the statutes of Illinois will reveal a considerable number
of other instances in which the legislature has amended existing
legislation by independent supplemental acts. One of the very
first acts under the new constitution consisted of a single section
providing that "the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and police
magistrates be, and is hereby, increased to $200 in all civil causes
in which they may now have, or may hereafter, have jurisdiction."
This surely in substance was an amending act. One of the first
amendments of the general city act of 1872 relating to the approval
of ordinances was accomplished by the so-called Mayor's Bill of
1875,11 which was an independent supplemental act clearly incom-
plete in itself and amendatory in character.
The acts of June 16, 1887,12 and of June 14, 1909,15 were
amendments of article 5, section 1 of the City Act. The act of
June 7, 1911,'4 amended article 7, section 9 of the City Act. The
act of May 7, 1879, prohibiting the sale of real estate by virtue of
powers of sale in mortgages was an independent supplemental act
amending the general mortgage act of 1874.15 The act of June 11,
1897, relating to publication of notices in chancery suits 16 was
clearly incomplete in itself and might as well have been made an
amendment of section 13 of the Chancery Act, yet its validity has
never been questioned on that account. The act of June 3, 1897,
relating to the probate of wills,1 7 amended section 2 of the Wills
7. Beginning with 4 Neb. 353.
8. 14 Ore. 365.
9. People v. Crossley, 261 Ill. 78.10. People v. Knopf, 183 Ill. 410-416.11. Hurd's Revised Statutes, Cities, 372-376.
12. Hurd, Cities, 628.
13. Hurd, Cities, 696.
14. Hurd, Cities, 718.15. See Hurd, Mortgages, Nos. 13, 14 and 22.16. Hurd, Notices, Sec. 9.
17. Hurd, Wills, 21.
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Act in important respects without referring to it. All these cases
are practically undistinguishable from the acts supplemental to and
amending the garnishment act, which were declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, and other instances could undoubtedly bediscovered by a careful examination of the statutes.
The Supreme Court now undertakes to reconcile its previousdecisions by differentiating legislation which, while modifying byimplication existing statutes, is in itself complete and intelligible,
and legislation not in itself complete or intelligible. The court
should be allowed to speak for itself: '
"If the act in question'is not complete within itself, and it is necessaryto read into the new law certain provisions of prior statutes in order to makeit intelligible, and the new act is an attempt to amend the old law by inter-mingling new and different provisions with the old ones or by adding newprovisions, so as to create out of the existing laws and the new act togethera complete act upon the subject, then the new act is held to be amendatoryof the old law, and the requirement of the Constitution must be compliedwith to make it valid. The acts involved in Badenoch v. City o Chicago[222 Ill. 71] and O'Connell v. McClenathan [248 IIl. 350] above cited, wereboth held to be unconstitutional because the new acts were not completewithin themselves, and it was necessary to resort to previous legislation uponthe subject of the acts in order to understand and enforce the new acts.It was distinctly said in both of those cases, however, that the acts con-demned were not complete within themselves, and that it was necessary, inorder to have any intelligent understanding of them, to refer to previouslegislation relating to the same subject. A careful comparison of the highschool law of 1911 with the acts held invalid in the two cases last abovecited will clearly show that the act assailed in this case does not belongto the class of legislation condemned in the Badenoch and McClena-than cases."
And the following is offered by the court as a formulation of
thd invalid practice (designated as Rule 3) :
"An act which is incomplete in itself, and in which new provisions airecommingled with old ones, so that it is necessary to read the two acts togetherin order to determine what the law is, is an amendatory act and invalid underthe Constitution, and it is unimportant, in such case, that the act does notpurport to amend or revive any other statute. This proposition is supportedby People v. Knopf, supra, Badenoch v. City of Chicago, supra, and O'Con-
nell v. McClenathan, supra"
The decision in People v. Crossley thus adheres to the doine
that the constitutional provision regarding amendments will under
circumstances apply to acts purporting to be independent but in
reality supplemental, and will invalidate them. Such a doctrineis both unsound in its foundation and unfortunate in its effects, for
not only must it throw doubt upon acts which have stood unques-
tioned for years, but it is also altogether uncertain in its application.
The constitutional provision should be interpreted in the light
of its history. The evil it dealt with was specific and well under-
stood. As a remedy for this evil, the constitutional provision is
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easily applicable. The draftsman of a statute will have no diffi-
culty in recognizing the constitutional requirement or in complying
with it, so long as it is confined to its original scope.
The doctrine applied to acts in form independent, and regu-
lating a portion of a subject, small segment though it be, in the
manner of the acts declared unconstitutional in the Badenoch and
O'Connell cases, offers no definite criterion at all. Any one who
is generally familiar with the law of garnishm'ent would have
understood perfectly the supplemental acts of 1897 and 1905. On
the other hand, no lawyer however learned or intelligent, will be
able to predict what kind of an act will appear to the Supreme
Court as unintelligible or incomplete in itself. Measured by the
only final test that we can apply to a rule of law, namely, the man-
ner of its practical operation, the doctrine to which the Supreme
Court pretends to adhere must be condemned. The court simply
adds another pitfall to the many already existing which render
legislation in Illinois a game of hazard.
The uncertainty produced in the minds of lawyers by the
decisions of the Supreme Court is well illustrated by the opinion
which was recently expressed in a discussion of a possible reorgani-
zation of the administration of the labor laws of Illinois. It was
conceded that it would be desirable to consolidate the various
bureaus and offices created by different statute's, in order to eliminate
duplication or conflict of authority. But it was contended that
under our constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court, it
would not be possible to effect this consolidation by one compre-
hensive statute, but that each of the acts conferring powers and
duties upon the bureau of labor statistics, the factory inspection
department, the free employment offices, etc., would have to be
amended separately. Can it be doubted that this would be an
extremely inconvenient and cumbersome method of legislation?
Surely no such unreasonable requirement was intended to be im-
posed by the constitution. Most likely it is unnecessary under the
decision of the Supreme Court; but as long as it adheres to the
doctrine even in the qualified form now promulgated, such doubts
will present thenmselves, and in order to avoid any risk the less
desirable form of legislation will be preferred.
There are, of course, cases where it is very simple to avoid
any risk and proceed by way of amendment. Congress has from
time to time extended the subjects of copyright. It has done so at
times by re-enacting the original provision, and including in the
HeinOnline  -- 8 Ill.L.R. 512 1913-1914
SUPPLEMENTAL ACTS
enumeration the new subjects,"" but it has also proceeded by simply
enacting that the provisions of the act shall extend to photographs
and negatives thereof.'9 The regular practice in Illinois would be
the former method and it may be conceded to be preferable. Would
the act of 1870 have to be considered invalid under the rule now
formulated by the Supreme Court? Certainly the framers of the
constitutional provision never had a supplemental act of this kind
in mind, and as a matter of principle it is entirely unobjectionable.
The various methods of changing the substance of existing
legislation without re-enacting some statute or section thereof in
amended form may well be illustrated by the following examples
taken from very recent Acts of Parliament:
1. 1 & 2 George V, c. 25 (1911): An act to Amend the
Government of India Act, 1858, Sec. 1: "In Section 18 of the
Government of India Act, 1858, the words "or to his legal per-
sonal representative such gratuity" shall be inserted after the
words "such compensation, superannuation, or retiring allowance"
where they secondly occur, and the words "or to personal repre-
sentatives of such persons" shall be inserted after the words "public
service," and also at the end of the section.
2. 1 & 2 George V, c. 44 (1911): An Act to amend the
Military Manoeuvers Act, 1897, Sec. 4: "Subsection (2) of sec-
tion 7 of the principal act (which imposes penalties on certain illegal
acts) shall have effect as if the following paragraph were therein
inserted after paragraph (b):
"or
(c) "erects or displays any notice or mark on or relating to
"any authorized land or authorized source of water rep-
"resenting or implying that the use of such land or source
"is not authorized."
3. 1 & 2 George V, c. 42 (1911) Sec. 1: "Among the courts
before which a ship may be brought for adjudication under section
76 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (which relates to pro-
ceedings on forfeiture of a ship), there shall be included any Brit-
ish Court in a foreign country, being a court having admiralty ju-
risdiction, as if such a court were included among the courts speci-
fied in that section, and that section shall be construed and have
effect accordingly."
4. 1 & 2 George V, c. 37 (1911): An act to amend the Con-
18. Febr. 3, 1831, St. L. 4, p. 436; July 8, 1870, St. L. 16, p.. 212.19. Mch. 3, 1865, 13 St. L. 540.
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veyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, Sec. 1: "On any appli-
cation under section 5 of the Act of 1881 the court may, if it thinks
fit, as respects any purchaser or vendor, dispense with the service
of any notice which is, by section 69 of that act, required to be
served on the purchaser or vendor."
5. 1 & 2 George V, c. 30 (1911): An Act to Extend the
Powers of the Public Health (Scotland), Act of .1897, Sec. 1 (1):
"The powers conferred by the Public Health (Scotland) Act,
1897, upon a local authority under that act, enabling such local
authority to carry sewers within their district, may be exercised by
any body of trustees or commissioners authorized to supply water
by any local act, within the limits of water supply under such act,
in the same way and subject to the like restrictions in relation to
water mains as they may be exercised in relation to sewers under
the said first mentioned act by the local authority within the district
of such authority."
No. I and No. 2 would violate the provision of our state con-
stitution; No. 3, No. 4 and No. 5 would probably fall under the
ban of rule (3) formulated in People v. Crossley, for they are cer-
tainly- incomplete enactments and plainly purport to deal with sub-
jects regulated by existing statutes. Yet the form chosen by the
legislature is simple, and may be quite as intelligible to legislators
and lawyers as the re-enactment of a section torn from the context
of the statute of which it forms part.
It is not merely that the rule laidl down by the Supreme Court
is extraordinarily ambiguous in its scope. Even if it were capable
of clearer definition, it would be unfortunate to tie the hands of
the legislature in a matter that is peculiarly one of discretion. It
must be obvious that it may be very unadvisable to reopen an entire
section for legislative discussion when all that is desired is a minor
change, the scope and effect of which can be made perfectly clear
by an independent provision. Indeed, the old 'and now forbidden
method of amendment, capable as it was of abuse, gave a much
readier clue to the intended and effected change than the present
method which requires a careful comparison between the old sec-
tion and the new. The legislature guards against this inconvenience
by requiring the new or altered matter to be printed in the bills
in italics; but this device is not adopted by our printed session laws.
Under these circumstances the method of proceeding by supple-
mental act should rather be encouraged than otherwise.
The inconvenience of incorporating the desired change in a
HeinOnline  -- 8 Ill.L.R. 514 1913-1914
SUPPLEMENTAL ACTS
re-enacted section is especially sensible where that section is long.
In several bills introduced into the legislature in recent years, pro-
posing to add to the powers of city councils, it was deemed neces-
sary to reprint the entire ninety-six items of article V, section 1
of the City Act-certainly a most superfluous way of proceeding,
by which nothing whatever is gained. As 'shown above, powers
have been added in the past by independent supplemental act; but as
long as the Badenoch and McConnell cases stand unreversed, the
latter method is unsafe.
Where a proposed change affects two or more existing sec-
tions, as in 1 and 2 George V, c. 37,20 it would tax the legislator's
ingenuity to determine which of the sections affected should be
re-enacted with amendments, while either a new section or a sup-
plemental act would avoid the difficulty altogether. Can any one
point to a provision of our constitution that requires a change to
be effected by an additional section rather than by a supplemental
act? Or can article IV, section 13, by any possibility be construed
to have that meaning? A new section cannot insert at length any
amended section, and wherever an additional section would be legiti-
mate, an independent supplemental act must be likewise legitimate.
The following difficulty, moreover, suggests itself where the
proposed change affects matter covered by two existing acts. Sup-
pose there are two acts, one relating to safety in factories, the
other relating to safety in mines. The legislature desires to add
to the penal provisions a provision for civil liability for non-com-
pliance with safety requirements. Under the case of Starne v.
People,21 it may be contended that the provision for civil liability
must apply to mine owners and factory owners equally.2 2 An inde-
pendent supplemental act which in substance amends both the
mining act and the factory act would thus be the safest as well as
the most desirable way to proceed; for of two separate amendatory
bills one might fail to pass, and the one passed might therefore turn
out to be invalid. But the supplemental act may be regarded as
obnoxious to the third rule formulated in People v. Crossley. The
draftsman would thus find himself between "the devil and the
deep sea." The Supreme Court would probably sustain the sup-
plemental act; but in doing so it would again cut down the province
of the application of rule (3) of People v. Crossley.
20. Example No. 4, above quoted.
21. 222 II1. 189.
22. See Laws of 1913, p. 359.
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Other difficulties must arise where, as in Illinois after 1870,
amendments are to apply to special charters, and yet are by the
constitution required to be made by general act; or where the
unamended section continues to have effect for some purposes, as
in the various acts increasing the salaries of the judges of the
Supreme Court. In such cases the constitutional provision would
be impracticable and it is therefore extremely unlikely that it was
intended to impede the flexibility of legislative methods.
It has been generally recognized by American courts that con-
stitutional provisions regarding style and form of legislation should
be liberally interpreted, since the only principle which they involve
is protection against fraud or surprise, and since dialectical refine-
ments as to their precise scope and meaning inevitably lead to insol-
uble controversies. The few instances of strict interpretation have
kenerally resulted in an uncertainty possibly more harmful than the
original loose practices, and have produced precautionary habits
of diffuseness which particularly in the matter of titles of acts, have
assumed the proportions of a serious evil.
In extending the provision regarding amending acts to inde-
pendent supplemental statutes, Illinois has the support of only one
or two other jurisdictions. The decisions on the application of the
provision have been believed by many lawyers to be inconsistent,
and beyond any doubt they have been confusing; even from the
decision in People v. Crossley two judges dissented. The wise
course would have been to repudiate the doctrine of the Badenoch
and McClenathan cases; instead of this, however, the Supreme
Court establishes an unworkable distinction, which does not fit the
decided cases, and perpetuates a difficulty which will continue to
vex draftsmen of statutes, and provide a fruitful field of litigation.
The operation of the constitutional provision should be con-
fined to amendatory acts which in terms purport to amend specific
provisions of earlier acts and which seek to accomplish the change
by substituting for or adding to words of some section of an
existing act other or new words to constitute part of such section.
ADDENDUM.
Since the above was written, there has appeared the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Brooks v. Hatch, 261 Ill. 179, 103
N. E. 746 (December 17, 1913).
The Drainage or Levee Act of 1870, as amended by act of June30, 1885 (Revised Statutes, Chap. 42), provides in section 17/2 that the
amount assessed for keeping a levee or ditch in repair, shall not in the
aggregate amount to a sum in any one year greater than would be pro-
duced by thirty cents per acre on all the lands within the district. The
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amount may also be used to complete, strengthen, protect, and add toditches and levees. Section 263/2 regulates the proceedings in connec-tion with such assessment in considerable detail.An act of 1905, professing to be an independent act, authorizedthe use of the amounts raised by assessment for the erection and opera-tion of pumping plants. An amendatory act to the act of 1905, passedin 1907, authorized assessment up to sixty cents per acre for the main-tenance of pumping plants, and a further amendatory act of 1911, repeal-ing the provision of 1907, authorized for the use of such pumping plantssuch amount as the county court should find accruing to the lands by
reason of the operation of said plants.The Supreme Court holds that the act of 1905 was unnecessary,
since the erection of pumping plants is an implied power under theDrainage and Levee Act. "The effect of the act of 1905, if valid, was tomake express and explicit that which was theretofore necessarily im-plied. By thus ingrafting said act of 1905 upon the Levee Act said
sections 172 and 262 are so amended as to expressly authorize theexpenditure of a portion of the annual assessments of benefits for theoperation of pumping plants as well as for the repair of the levees andditches. As it was purely an amendatory act and was passed in viola-tion of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution it was invalid. Theamendment of 1907 is a more flagrant violation of the constitution thanthe original act of 1905, as it amends said sections 175/2 and 26/ of theLevee Act by substituting in the restriction therein placed upon theprovision for the annual assessments for benefits the sum of sixty centsper acre for that of thirty cents per acre."The decision thus again applies the doctrine that under certain condi-tions new provisions concerning matters covered by existing statutesmust in order to be valid assume the form of amendatory acts. The un-
soundness of the doctrine as applied to this case can be clearly demon-
strated.
Whether the power to construct pumping plants was implied or not,the legislature had power to express it, and this the Supreme Court
concedes. But if so, had not the legislature power to resolve this doubtin a separate section? Is there anything in the constitution that pre-vents the legislature from arranging the matter of its statutes in asmany sections as it pleases? And if it would have beefi placed in aseparate section in the original act why could such a section not havebeen added by an amendatory act? And as the constitutional provisioncannot possibly apply to additional sections (the requirement of re-en-
actment not fitting such a case) there is no constitutional provision atall to apply, and the legislature is free to proceed by amendatory actor by supplemental act. There is no escape from this conclusion. TheSupreme Court overlooks the distinction between additional and cor-
rective matter.
The narrow view taken by the Supreme Court is moreover most
unfortunate in its practical results.It is not desirable that long and involved sections should be furthercomplicated by the addition of provisoes; let any one who is not im-pressed with this fact, look at the new Income Tax Act. As a matterof good drafting the provision regarding pumping plants and the higherrate of assessment for" their use should have preferably been placedin a separate section. Intelligent legislation demands a certain sim-plicity of form. The Supreme Court instead of encouraging practices thatmake for intelligibility, forces cumbersome and inconvenient methods of leg-islation. The case of People v. Crossley gave hope for a more open-minded
construction of the constitution; but that hope is destroyed by this decision.
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